

FPGAs in Space Environment and Design Techniques

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June 25, 2001

Goals


- Brief overview of the radiation environment
- What type of radiation effects are there?
- How are devices tested?
- How should the results be interpreted?
- How can we protect our systems?

Outline

- Environment and Effects
- Total Dose
- Single Event Upset
- Single Event Latchup
- Single Event Transient
- Antifuse and Rupture
- Protons
- Loss of Functionality
- Miscellaneous

Environment and Effects

The Radiation Environment



Barth, MAPLD '98


Components of the Natural Environment

- Transient
 - Galactic Cosmic Rays
 - Hydrogen & Heavier Ions
 - Solar Particle Events
 - Protons & Heavier Ions
- Trapped
 - Electrons, Protons, & Heavier Ions
- Atmospheric & Terrestrial Secondaries
 - Neutrons

Barth, MAPLD '98

GCRs: Integral LET Spectra

CREME 96, Solar Minimum, 100 mils (2.54 mm) Al



Barth, MAPLD '98


LET (MeV-cm²/mg)

Types of Single Event Effects


Acronym	Definition	Description
SEU	Single Event Upset	Change of information stored
SED	Single Event Disturb	Momentary disturb of information stored in memory bit
SET	Single Event Transient	Current transient induced by passage of a particle, can propagate to cause output error in combinational logic
SEDR	Single Event Dielectric Rupture	Essentially fusible rupture
SEOR	Single Event Oxide Rupture	Rupture of gate dielectric caused by a high current flow
SEL	Single Event Latchup	High current regenerative state induced in 2-layer device (Junction)
SES	Single Event Snapback	High current regenerative state induced in NMOS device (mosfet)
MBU	Multiple Bit Upset	Several memory bits upset by passage of the same particle
SEFI	Single Event Functional Interrupt	Corruption of control paths by an upset

Total Dose


Recombination, Transport, and Trapping of Carries



GSFC Total Dose Facility




Example TID Static Bias Board Supports In Situ Testing




MIL-Std-883 Method 1019.5







Annealing allowed for parametric failures; not for functional failures.







1019.5 also allows for low dose rate testing.



A14100AMEC TID TEST - Room Temp Anneal
D/C 9849 - UCL064 Lot Split
Post 20 krad(Si) Exposure @ 2.45 rad (Si) / Minute
NASA/GSFC
Anneal Started August 3, 1999









TID Capability vs. Feature Size

Recent 0.8 and 1.0 μm TID Results




TID Capability vs. Feature Size

Submicron FPGA TID Tolerance
0.35 μm to 0.6 μm




Process Mods - 0.6 μm

RT54SX18 Prototype
Lot Split TID Test
NASA/GSFC - Actel
July 3, 1998
1 kRad (Si) / Hour




Process Mods - 0.25 μm

A54SX32A (Prototype) TID TEST
D/C 9024
P04 Wafer 12 and 20
NASA/GSFC
September 24, 1998




Dose Depth Curves







Somewhat Radiation Dose



Shield of 46 MeV Protons

Shield Performance for 46 MeV Protons







In Situ measurement of Propagation Delay

Real-time Digitized Input and Output Waveforms


Before irradiation $t_{PO} = 135\text{ns}$ After accumulating 90 krad: $t_{PO} = 260\text{ns}$



A500K050 TID Test
Prototype Test
1 krad(Si) / Hour
NASA GSFC
April 14, 2000




Total Dose Effects on FLASH Switch




- Ionizing radiation discharge the floating gate
 - Increase ON-state NMOS transistor resistance, increase RC delay in the data path
 - Increase OFF-state NMOS sub-threshold leakage, increase I_{cc}

RT54SX32S (Prototype) TID TEST
0.25 μm , MEC
DC 0.19 - L/C T25/JP01 001
1 krad (Si) / Hour
NASA/GSFC
December 1, 2000



A14100A TID TEST
0.8 μm , MEC
L/C UCL055 - LAN 171
1 krad (Si) / Hour
NASA/GSFC
January 24, 2001



Single Event Upset (SEU)

Definitions

Single Event Upset (SEU) is a change of state or transient induced by an ionizing particle such as a cosmic ray or proton in a device. This may occur in digital, analog, and optical components or may have effects in surrounding circuitry. These are "soft" bit errors in that a reset or rewriting of the device causes normal behavior thereafter. A full SEU analysis considers the system effects of an upset. For example, a single bit flip, while not damaging to the circuitry involved, may damage the subsystem or system (i.e., initiating a pyrotechnic event).

Definitions

Linear Energy Transfer (LET) is a measure of the energy transferred to the device per unit length as an ionizing particle travels through a material. The common unit is MeV-cm²/mg of material (Si for MOS devices).


LET threshold (LET_{TH}) is the minimum LET to cause an effect. The JEDEC recommended definition is the first effect when the particle fluence = 10⁷ ions/cm².

Definitions


Cross section (σ) is the device SEE response to ionizing radiation. For an experimental test for a specific LET, σ = #errors/(ion fluence). The units for cross section are cm² per device or per bit.

Asymptotic or saturation cross section (σ_{sat}) is the value that the cross section approaches as LET gets very large.


Sensitive volume refers to the device volume affected by SEE-inducing radiation. The geometry of the sensitive volume is not easily known, but some information is gained from test cross section data.




SEE Test Setup




Heavy Ion Testing at BNL



Example SEE DUT Card




Heavy Ion Testing at BNL




Heavy Ion Testing at BNL









Cross Section versus LET Curve



SEU X-Section vs. Feature Size Old Technology








Figure 3. K-Latch schematic, simplified. The asynchronous structure and interlocks eliminate the need for a free running clock to scrub SEUs.







Figure 5. Simplified test circuitry logic.



SRAM Switch Technology




Resistor De-coupling Hardened SRAM




- Increase internal latch delay.
 - no upset when response time > recovery time.
 - Poly-resistor has high temperature coefficient.
 - Poly-resistance has large process variation

XQR4036XL SEU Cross Section



SRAM Memory Sizes



XQR4036XL SEU Rates

Table 2. Upset rates for several orbital environments.


1997 WCU 4036XL Launch Rate and AT Shielding					
Trapped at	Orbital per	0.0500 per	ALSF 0.1	Launch H/I	90% w/c H/I
Geosynchronous	1.05E-03	1.05E-03	1.05E-03	1.05E-03	1.05E-03
2.5GEO	2.40E-04	2.79E-04	3.18E-04	3.45E-04	3.62E-04
Launch vehicle from Vandenberg, no AT shielding	0.162E-03	0.230E-03	0.290E-03	0.350E-03	0.390E-03

Table 3. Probability of upsets and total upsets per launch (for 2.5 GEO year mission).

Probability of upsets and total upsets per launch (for 2.5 GEO year mission)					
Trapped at	Orbital per	0.0500 per	ALSF 0.1	Launch H/I	90% w/c H/I
0	0	0	0	0	0.05
2.5GEO	(37 years)	(27 upsets)	(155 upsets)	(114 upsets)	(17 upsets)
Launch vehicle from Vandenberg, 100% AT shielding, assume 4.2 for mission & 0.1 for launch in the event of a fail-safe	0.5934	-	-	0.0045	-
Launch vehicle from Vandenberg, 100% AT shielding, assume 4.2 for mission & 0.1 for launch in the event of a fail-safe	1.1795	-	-	0.0093	-
Launch vehicle from Vandenberg, 100% AT shielding, assume 4.2 for mission & 0.1 for launch in the event of a fail-safe	1.8651	-	-	0.0141	-


From Lum

Virtex FPGA Static Heavy Ion SEU Sensitivity





An upset in configuration control logic register was observed

Weibull Curve for Average POR Heavy Ion Cross-section (Data provided by Saab Ericsson Space)




XQR1701L PROM





UT4090


- User flip-flops hardened
- I/O flip-flops not hardened
- RAM blocks not hardened



Solar Flare and SEU Rates

# of modules	input pattern	module design	LET thresh.	sigma	upsets/1000 b-days cosmic ray	upsets/1000 b-days solar flare
102	0'5	C	25	1E-6	2.32E-4	1.32
40	0'5	S	25	4E-7	4.2E-5	0.16
360	0'4	S (H)	25	4E-7		
60	0'5	S (VH)	25	4E-7		
102	1'3	C	55	1E-7	4.44E-10	1.86E-8
40	1'3	S	5	6E-8	0.77	1.224
360	1'3	S (H)	5	6E-8		
60	1'3	S (VH)	5	6E-8		

Note effect of logic state on SEU Rate.



Software Support for SEU-Hardening


- Synopsis Design Compiler
- Synplicity Synplify
- NASA-GSFC ‘Macro Substitution’
- Actmap & Actgen

Single Event Latchup (SEL)


Definitions

Single Event Latchup (SEL) is a potentially destructive condition involving parasitic circuit elements forming a silicon controlled rectifier (SCR). In traditional SEL, the device current may destroy the device if not current limited and removed "in time." A "microlatch" is a subset of SEL where the device current remains below the maximum specified for the device. A removal of power to the device is required in all non-catastrophic SEL conditions in order to recover device operations.


Latchup Basics




EPI Layer, Latchup, and Ion Range








SEL - QL3025 0.35 μm



Chip Express Latchup Comparison





Latchup Summary

Device Type	Size/Voltage (nominal core)	Threshold (MeV-cm ² /mg)	Comments
* Pre-prod.			
RH1020	1.0 μ m / 5.0	> 74	
QL14X32B	0.65 μ m / 5.0	< 18	Destructive
RT54SX16/32*	0.8 μ m / 3.3	> 120	
A54SX32A*	0.25 μ m / 2.5	High	
QYH530	0.8 μ m / 5.0	52	One-Mask
CX2041	0.6 μ m / 2.5	> 37	LPGA
CX3001	0.35 μ m / 3.3	Low	
A54SX16*	0.35 μ m / 3.3	> 74	
QL3025	0.35 μ m / 3.3	< 11	Destructive
XQR4062XL*	0.35 μ m / 3.3	> 100	

Ex. SEL Detection and Clearing





Figure 8-5 AR2P-3500 Latching circuit

Note that FPGA have high I/O count with diodes to V_{CC} and GND in most cases.

Single Event Transient (SET)


Single Event Transient (SET)




Fraction of a nanosecond to several nanoseconds.

From Aerospace

Critical Transient Width vs Feature Size for Unattenuated Propagation




Double Clocking As a Result of Heavy Ion Induced Pulse




Cartoon of clock/logic upset. The device is most sensitive during the transition.


Clock Upset Instrumentation




Clock Upset Cross Section RH1020




Frequency Dependence of Clock Upset



SET in PAL



Driver Contention Due to CSRAM Upset



Mode 1 Transient Upset

- Transient pulse higher than half V_DC will propagate
 • $Q_{ch} \sim 0.02\text{pC}$, or $\text{LET}_{th} \sim 2\text{MeV}\cdot\text{cm}^2/\text{mg}$ for the worst case



Antifuse and Rupture


Antifuse Technology



ONO Antifuse
 Poly/ONO/N++
 Heavy az doped Poly/N++
 Thickness controlled by
 CVD nitride
 Program - 18V
 Typical Toxono ~ 85 Å
 RH1280 Toxono = 99 Å
 R = 200 - 500 ohms

TD Amorphous Silicon Antifuse
 'Pancake' Stack Between Metal 2 and 3
 Designed for 3.6V Operation in Sea Of Gates FPGA
 'Logic' Devices Program at ~ 10V
 'Substrate' Devices Program at ~ 30V
 Thickness ~ 500 - 1000 Å
 R = 20 - 100 ohms

Quicklogic ViaLink Antifuse



Antifuse Construction

Antifuse Radiation Effects

- Unprogrammed Reliability is the Key Concern
 - ONO
 - Amorphous Silicon (AS)
- Manufacturers:
 - Actel (ONO, Silicon) FPGA
 - L-M (ONO) PROM
 - Pico Systems (AS) Programmable Substrate
 - Quick Logic (AS) FPGA
 - UTMC (AS) PAL, PROM

Gate Rupture






Figure 5A. Critical oxide field for SiGeR as a function of ion LET for various gate oxide thicknesses. In this data the breakdown field increases significantly for the thin oxides (After [Sect. 97]).


Comparison of Rupture Currents




Substrate α -Silicon Antifuse F/A Using Liquid Crystal




ONO Antifuse Breakdown - FA




Heavy Ion Damage and Failure Analysis



Antifuse Failure Thresholds




Antifuse Rupture Ion Energy Dependence



Antifuse Improvements

- Decrease Electric Field Strength
 - Thicker Antifuses (RH1020, RH1280)
 - Low Bias Voltage (L-M PROM)
- Antifuse “Recipe”
 - (RT54SX16, RH54SX16, RT54SX32)
- Minimize Bias Time
 - (UTMC PROM)
- Reduce Sensitivity
 - Differential Measurements (UTMC PROM)

Dielectric Antifuse Cross Sections



Antifuse Rupture






Figure 1: Summary of antifuse rupture data. Positive margin at LET = 37 MeV-cm²/mg is shown for production RH1020 with a hardened ONO antifuse. One "recipe" of an M224 antifuse did not fail at LET = 82 MeV-cm²/mg. $V_{max} = 400$ mV

Protons

Proton Testing at UC Davis



I_{CC} Damage During Proton Testing ASIC and Antifuse FPGA



Note: Different scales for each run.

A1280XL Proton Results





Figure 7 A1280XL proton testing results

from Wang et al

RH1280 Proton Upsets



From Lockheed-Martin/Actel

• S module threshold = 36 MeV
▼ C and Modified S > 148 MeV

A1280A Proton Upsets


Table 2. Summary for A1280A

No.	Test	Event Rate Bursts/ sec	Length spaced	Estimated Cross-section (nm ² /bit) by test
10-129	1015	1	0	40 x 10 ⁻¹⁷
10-130	1015	2	0	60 x 10 ⁻¹⁷
10-131	1014	3	4	50 x 10 ⁻¹⁷
10-132	1014 x 10 ⁻¹	3	4	80 x 10 ⁻¹⁷
10-133	1014 x 10 ⁻¹	2	12	110 x 10 ⁻¹⁷
10-134	1014 x 10 ⁻¹	2	2	115 x 10 ⁻¹⁷
10-135	1014 x 10 ⁻¹	2	2	80 x 10 ⁻¹⁷
10-136	1014 x 10 ⁻¹	2	8	110 x 10 ⁻¹⁷
10-137	1014 x 10 ⁻¹	2	12	110 x 10 ⁻¹⁷
10-138	1014 x 10 ⁻¹	2	0	40 x 10 ⁻¹⁷
10-139	1014 x 10 ⁻¹	2	4	80 x 10 ⁻¹⁷

Proton Sensitivities - 195 MeV

Device Type	Size/Voltage (nominal core)	Est. X-Sec (cm ² / f-f)	Comments
A1280A	1.0 μm / 5.0	$\sim 137 \times 10^{-15}$	19 Parts Tested
RH1020	1.0 μm / 5.0	$< 2 \times 10^{-15}$	
RH1280	0.8 μm / 5.0	$\sim 400 \times 10^{-15}$	S-Module
QYH500	0.8 μm / 3.3	$< 0.5 \times 10^{-15}$	No upsets det.
RT54SX16	0.6 μm / 3.3	$\sim 6 \times 10^{-15}$	
QL3025	0.35 μm / 3.3	$< 4 \times 10^{-15}$	No upsets det.
A54SX16	0.35 μm / 3.3	$\sim 3 \times 10^{-15}$	
JT22VP10	? μm / 5.0	$\sim 2 \times 10^{-11}$	Cypress die

Virtex FPGA Static Proton SEU Sensitivity




Configuration control logic register upset noted at 63MeV

Loss of Functionality

Definitions

Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) is a condition where the device stops operating in its normal mode, and usually requires a power reset or other special sequence to resume normal operations. It is a special case of SEU changing an internal control signal. One example would be a DRAM entering the test mode defined by JEDEC. Another example is a microcircuit with IEEE 1149.1 JTAG circuitry leaving the TEST_LOGIC_RESET state and loading an unintended instruction into the instruction register (IR). Like other SEUs, the system effects must be properly analyzed. For example, a JTAG upset can cause the device to draw high currents or turn inputs into an output. The latter could, for example, drive a clock line to ground; thus, an independent clock signal should be used for the TCLK pin on devices without the optional TRST* pin.

FRAM Memory Functionality Loss During Heavy Ion Test



Strip chart of FM1608 (research fab) current during heavy ion irradiation. The device lost functionality during the test while the current decreased from its normal dynamic levels of approximately 6.3 mA to its quiescent value, near zero. The device recovered functionality and operated normally throughout the latter part of the test. This effect was seen at least three times during the limited testing of this device.

DRAM Modes

DRAM Special Test and Operational Modes


This standard defines a scheme for controlling a series of special modes for address multiplexed DRAM. The standard defines the logic interface required to enter, control, and exit from the special modes. In addition, it defines a basic special test mode plus a series of other special test and operational modes.

TEST MODES are those that implement some special test of measurement function or algorithm designed to enhance the ability of the Vendor or User to determine the integrity of, or to characterize, the part.

OPERATIONAL MODES are those that alter the operational characteristics of the part but do not interfere with its function as a storage device and are intended to be used in system operation.

JEDEC Standard No. 21-C, page 3.9.5-7, Release 4

DRAM Refresh









Adapted from: <http://www.techchannel.de/hardware/173/6.html>

DRAM Refresh


CAS#-BEFORE-RAS# REFRESH is a frequently used method of refresh because it is easy to use and offers the advantage of a power savings. Here's how CBR REFRESH works. The die contains an internal counter which is initialized to a random count when the device is powered up. Each time a CBR REFRESH is performed, the device refreshes a row based on the counter, and then the counter is incremented. When CBR REFRESH is performed again, the next row is refreshed and the counter is incremented. The counter will automatically wrap and continue when it reaches the end of its count. There is no way to reset the counter. The user does not have to supply or keep track of row addresses.

Since CBR REFRESH uses the internal counter and not an external address, the address buffers are powered down. For power-sensitive applications, this can be a benefit because there is no additional current used in switching address lines on a bus, nor will the DRAMs pull extra power if the address voltage is at an intermediate state.


Adapted from: Micron Technical Note TN-04-30: "Various Methods of DRAM Refresh."



JTAG Upset Effect - TCK On



SEE Results - Loss of Functionality Atmel AT28C010 EEPROM, D/C 9706



"Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) Sensitivity in EEPROMs," R. Koga, 1998 MAPLD International Conference, Greenbelt, MD.

Atmel AT28C010 EEPROM, D/C 9706 Type I Errors

- Manifested by the appearance of repeated errors, once the first error had been detected during ion irradiation. Here, the first error appeared at some point in time, which was tens of reading cycles ("cycle" is defined in Section II) after the exposure had started. Thereafter we observed one error every few cycles.
- Errors were altered bits in one word at various address locations.
- Simultaneously with the observation of the first error, the device bias current increased to 26 mA from 20 mA (normal, pre-error condition). The bias current continued to be 26 mA until the reading process stopped. At that time, the current became 0.2 mA (quietest level).
- When the device was read again (without power-cycling), the bias current returned to 26 mA and errors appeared again (even without the beam).
- If the power to the device was shut off and re-started again (power-cycled), the device again functioned properly (i.e., no errors).
- In one instance we continued the irradiation without power-cycling for a long time, until the device no longer showed any errors. It appeared that the affected bit underwent additional upset, returning to the original polarity and thereby correcting the problem.

Atmel AT28C010 EEPROM, D/C 9706 Type II Errors


- Manifested by "00" in all address locations, once the first "00" was read.
- These errors could be removed only by power-cycling the device.

Atmel AT28C010 EEPROM, D/C 9706 Type III Errors

- Characterized by occasional errors in a byte, which appeared once in many cycles. There was no 'after-effect' for this type of error. In other words, one error appeared independently once in a while.
- Caused by an upset in the output buffer.

X28HC256 CMOS EEPROM Xicore, D/C 9140

- Upset mode which also required the cycling of power to clear.




Loss of Functionality Serial PROM

- Xilinx XQR1701L
 - 10% saturated intercept at LET=6 MeV-cm²/mg, 1.2×10^{-5} cm²/device

Reference: DS062 (v3.0) February 8, 2001.

XQR1701L




Loss of Functionality Processors

- Processor simply stopped functioning without showing any observable bit errors.
- Noticed lockup in many microprocessors including MG80C186, MG80C286, and XC68302.
- Sensitivity to lockup was essentially independent of the test programs.

"Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) Sensitivity in EEPROMs," R. Koga, 1998 MAPLD International Conference, Greenbelt, MD.

Loss of Functionality Processors: XC68302 Example



Miscellaneous

LVDO Regulator Failure

LM1117T-3.3 LVDO Heavy Ion Test


NASA/GSFC

SN 3, Run 15


Iodine, 45 Degrees, 8.2×10^4 p/cm²/sec

LET = 84.7 MeV·cm²/mg

BNL, April, 1999



FRAM Memory Functionality Loss During Total Dose Test



In situ dark current measurements of two serial and one parallel FRAM device types. This initial study showed that the Ratem (Arch) and Rensoren research fab (parallel devices) could withstand moderate doses without significant leakage currents. Post irradiation testing of the FM16K showed that all devices catastrophically failed. Annealing did not help. In situ functional tests or a step irradiation method are needed for determination of the functional limits. The base CMOS process is not the limiting factor for the FM16K.

EDAC Techniques

EDAC Method	EDAC Capability
Parity	Single bit error detect
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)	Detects if any errors have occurred in a given structure
Hamming Code	Single bit correct, double bit detect
Reed-Solomon Code	Corrects multiple and consecutive bytes in error
Convolutional Code	Corrects isolated burst noise in a communication stream
Overlying Protocol	Specific to each system. Example: retransmission protocol

From LaBel

Control-Error Protection Schemes

Protection Method	Capability
Watchdog Timer	If not reset within the designed interval, perform some function (usually a system reset).
Redundancy	Two equivalent systems operate on the same data. If the two systems disagree, a system reset is performed.
Lockstep	Two devices in a system are clocked simultaneously, and which are provided common inputs. If the devices disagree, perform a system reset.
Voting	Use three or more devices to perform the same function. If one device disagrees with the rest, use the remaining devices to determine the next system state.
Repetition	A system must provide the same data more than once to perform some action. Used, for instance, to lower the risk of an inadvertent spacecraft command being executed.

Definitions (1)

Single Event Upset (SEU) is a change of state or transient induced by an ionizing particle such as a cosmic ray or proton in a device. This may occur in digital, analog, and optical components or may have effects in surrounding circuitry. These are "soft" bit errors in that a reset or rewriting of the device causes normal behavior thereafter. A full SEU analysis considers the system effects of an upset. For example, a single bit flip, while not damaging to the circuitry involved, may damage the subsystem or system (i.e., initiating a pyrotechnic event).

Single Hard Error (SHE) is an SEU which causes a permanent change to the operation of a device. An example is a permanent stuck bit in a memory device.

Definitions (2)

Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) is a condition where the device stops operating in its normal mode, and usually requires a power reset or other special sequence to resume normal operations. It is a special case of SEU changing an internal control signal. One example would be a DRAM entering the test mode defined by JEDEC. Another example is a microcircuit with IEEE 1149.1 JTAG circuitry leaving the TEST_LOGIC_RESET state and loading an unintended instruction into the instruction register (IR). Like other SEUs, the system effects must be properly analyzed. For example, a JTAG upset can cause the device to draw high currents or turn inputs into an output. The latter could, for example, drive a clock line to ground, thus, an independent clock signal should be used for the TCLK pin on devices without the optional TRST* pin.

Definitions (3)

Single Event Latchup (SEL) is a potentially destructive condition involving parasitic circuit elements forming a silicon controlled rectifier (SCR). In traditional SEL, the device current may destroy the device if not current limited and removed "in time." A "microlatch" is a subset of SEL where the device current remains below the maximum specified for the device. A removal of power to the device is required in all non-catastrophic SEL conditions in order to recover device operations.

Single Event Burnout (SEB) is a highly localized burnout of the drain-source in power MOSFETs. SEB is a destructive condition.

Definitions (4)

Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) is the burnout of a gate insulator in a power MOSFET. SEGR is a destructive condition.

Linear Energy Transfer (LET) is a measure of the energy transferred to the device per unit length as an ionizing particle travels through a material. The common unit is MeV·cm²/mg of material (Si for MOS devices).

LET threshold (LET_{TH}) is the minimum LET to cause an effect. The JEDEC recommended definition is the first effect when the particle fluence = 10⁷ ions/cm².

Definitions (5)

Cross section (sigma) is the device SEE response to ionizing radiation. For an experimental test for a specific LET, $\sigma = \text{#errors}/(\text{ion fluence})$. The units for cross section are cm² per device or per bit.

Asymptotic or saturation cross section (sigmasat) is the value that the cross section approaches as LET gets very large.

Sensitive volume refers to the device volume affected by SEE-inducing radiation. The geometry of the sensitive volume is not easily known, but some information is gained from test cross section data.